March 9, 1934, Cheyenne, Wyoming, two Douglas O-38 observation planes were directed to relocate to Salt Lake City to pick up U.S. Mail for delivery over the west coast mail route. As a result of a scandal the Post-Master General cancelled commercial air mail contracts. Since mid-February the Army Air Corps was pressed into service to fly airmail. Biplanes like the Boeing P-12, Keystone B-6, and single-engine Douglas O-38 were among the aircraft assigned to fly airmail. Many of the pilots ordered to fly the airmail, mostly at night as on this occasion, were second lieutenants with limited flying experience. 2Lt. Bernard A. Schriever, a pilot for less than a year, waited to take off in an open cockpit O-38. Ahead of him two other second lieutenants took off in an O-38E with an enclosed cockpit much more comfortable in winter weather. They don’t make it. Something went wrong on takeoff, and they ran into a power line, crashed in flames with both killed. In just a couple months of flying the mail with aircraft poorly equipped for night flying, flown by pilots with limited experience, there are over sixty crashes and a dozen fatalities! The airmail fiasco was lesson one in the dangers of inadequate technology.
From Great Depression to War. As an officer with a reserve commission Bennie was released from active duty about a year after flying the airmail. For a year during that Depression era he had a non-flying job in the Army, commanding a camp of the Civilian Conservation Corps. By 1937 he was back in the cockpit as a pilot for Northwest Airlines flying a Lockheed 10 Electra between Seattle and Billings Montana. The Lockheed 10 was a modern looking twin-engine all metal monoplane with retractable landing gear. It was also equipped with effective flight instruments and radio communications. It first flew about the time Bennie was flying the airmail. Other commercial airliners, the Boeing 247 and Douglas DC-2, embodied features in advance of military aircraft of that era. In 1929 airlines jointly created a company, Aeronautical Radio Inc. (AIRINC) to upgrade and standardize radio equipment and instruments for aviation use and pioneer radio navigation. By the mid-1930’s civil aviation technology was in advance of the military. Air Corps chief Benjamin Foulois pushed for progress to change that but encountered resistance from some legislators and executive branch “go slower” advocates.
In March 1938 Brig. Gen. H.H. Arnold flew out to Seattle to confer with the President of Boeing Aircraft Company. Arnold had been Bennie’s base commander when he joined the 9th Bomb Squadron at March Field, California. Arnold organized a golf foursome that included Bennie (Bennie was a golf champion in college). The Air Corps was opening regular commissions for selected reserve officers. Arnold urged Bennie to apply. Arnold explained that he envisioned an all-weather air force and wanted to get pilots with knowledge and experience in instrument flying into the Air Corps on a permanent basis. Later in 1938 after completing a comprehensive examination, Bennie took the oath as a regular officer. He was assigned to the 7th Bomb Squadron and served as an instrument flying instructor on B-18s.
Bennie graduated from college in 1931 with a degree in architectural engineering. In July 1940 he entered the Air Corps Engineering School at Wright Field, Ohio. Bennie certainly had the qualifications, but it did not hurt that Brig. Gen. George Brett, his father-in-law, recommended him. The commandant of the school was Brig. Gen. George Kenney. After completing the school with a superior ranking and flying as a test pilot on many types of aircraft he was sent to pursue more education, a master’s degree in aeronautical engineering at Stanford. That’s where he was when Pearl Harbor was attacked. Instead of being immediately called to an operational assignment he was told to complete his degree. In June 1942 he was ordered to Australia as a member of the 19th Bomb Group. Gen. MacArthur’s air commander was Maj. Gen. George Brett but in short order he was sent back to the States. Brett’s replacement was Maj. Gen. George Kenney.
Bennie spearheaded maintenance for the 19th Bomb Group occasionally flying combat missions in the B-17. By the time the 19th rotated back to the States he had flown ten combat missions in addition to his maintenance duties. Bennie remained in Australia. He eventually was credited with over thirty combat missions. He modified B-17 bomb racks to take flares and flew one of the first flare dropping missions on September 24, 1942. Before the 19th was relieved Bennie managed to get many of its heavily used Flying Fortresses operational and on October 10 a record number of thirty B-17s mounted a night bombing mission against Rabaul, New Britain. In January 1943 Kenney appointed Bennie as chief of maintenance of the Fifth Air Force Air Service Command. He ended the war as chief of the Advanced Echelon, Far East Air Service Command with the rank of Colonel.
Pentagon to Los Angeles to Air Force Systems Command. Bennie returned to the United States after serving overseas from mid-1942 to late 1945 (he was present on the U.S.S. Missouri for Japan’s surrender) broken by only thirty days of home leave. Back in the U.S. he served for over three years as chief of scientific liaison for material. In this position he had numerous interactions with the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) created by Chief of Staff General Hap Arnold. He became familiar with its chairman Theodore von Karman world renowned aerodynamicist, Jimmy Doolittle, Edward Teller and other notables. The SAB was chartered by Arnold to look twenty years into the future with respect to the technological needs and opportunities for the Air Force. During Bennie’s tenure as scientific liaison the Air Force became a separate service. Next Bennie spent another year in academia graduating from the National War College in 1950. Returning to the Pentagon, he became the head of the Air Force’s Development Planning Office.
Bennie became aware of the thermonuclear breakthrough during 1953. The breakthrough (verified by tests in 1954) was that hydrogen bombs could be made much smaller and lighter than previously thought and far more powerful (1 megaton) than fission bombs (the Hiroshima bomb weighed 4 tons to deliver 15,000 tons equivalent of TNT). A lighter explosive that did not need to hit a target as accurately as a conventional atomic bomb made delivery by long range missile feasible. In February 1954 the von Neuman committee report (also known as Teapot Report) recommended development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as a high national priority aiming for an operational capability in six to eight years. Bennie, now a brigadier general, was the Air Force liaison to the committee. Dismissing cruise missiles such as the ram jet powered Navajo the committee focused on Convair’s Atlas. Convair applied the name Atlas to a series of missile projects. The first dating to 1946 was essentially a study and technology demonstration project. It was cancelled in 1947. A contract for a second Atlas in 1951 related to a huge vehicle 12 feet in diameter and 160 feet tall capable of carrying a very large atomic bomb.
The Teapot Report specified that the aim of having an operational ICBM by 1960 would only be possible if a “radical reorganization” was implemented. New ways of doing business outside the standard bureaucracy and regulations would be needed. This was music to the ears of Trevor Gardner, special assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for research and development. It fit in exactly with his ideas as well as General Schriever’s. In March 1954 the Secretary of the Air Force directed Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) to redirect, expand and accelerate the Atlas program through a military-civilian group (the required expertise was not available within the military). The third iteration of Atlas would be scaled down to 10 feet in diameter and 110 feet tall. Propulsion, guidance, the reentry vehicle and other key components needed to be developed in addition to the basic airframe of the missile. By May Atlas was given top priority. In the months that followed Bennie was named deputy commander of ARDC and head of a new command, Western Development Division (WDD), to be established in Los Angeles to develop Atlas and related programs. The contract for Atlas development and test was signed in January 1955. This was followed by a contract with Martin for a second ICBM, Titan, as a backstop in case Atlas failed and a contract with Douglas for an intermediate range missile (IRBM) Thor. Later the solid-fuel Minuteman was added to the portfolio.
The WDD military-civilian team was off and running. The heart of the civilian side of the team was Ramo-Woolridge (later TRW), responsible for systems engineering and providing expertise as needed. WDD did not have direct control of procurement but pushed for an approach where the letter of the law was followed but extraneous regulations and unnecessary bureaucracy studiously avoided. General Schriever sought out tough-minded smart subordinates not “yes men.” The goal was the best for the program which meant best of breed was sought for key subsystems and were not pre-ordained for Convair (later General-Dynamics). Convair pushed back for in-house work. Thomas Lanphier was brought in to advocate for Convair with congressional and Pentagon leaders. Lanphier could open doors for Convair due to his reputation for having shot down Admiral Yamamoto during the war. WDD remained firm. Key components and subsystems went to companies with the best capabilities.
The results were amazing! By the end of 1959 an initial squadron of Atlas ICBMs was operational at Vandenberg Air Force Base and the first operational Thor IRBM had arrived in Great Britain. Titan was almost as fast – six years to operational capability. Compare this to other advanced systems of that era. It took the B-47 eight years from program start to operational capability. For the B-52 nine and half years, the B-58 eleven. The Navajo cruise missile was under development for nine and half years when the program was cancelled.
When Atlas was decommissioned as a weapon in 1965, it had already proved its usefulness as a space launch vehicle. America’s first manned orbital flight with John Glenn in a Mercury spacecraft was boosted to orbit by an Atlas. Titan also joined Atlas as a space launch vehicle supporting both military, civil and commercial space programs. General Schriever’s leadership also saw the first polar orbiting reconnaissance satellite (Discoverer I) launched by an Atlas with an Agena upper stage. Other firsts included the first object recovered from space. It was a film pack from a photo reconnaissance satellite snagged by a C-130 over the Pacific as it descended by parachute. Other pioneering satellite programs were also successful. General Schriever went on to become commander of ARDC. ARDC eventually became Air Force Systems Command with its portfolio expanding beyond space to aircraft and other systems. Four-star General Bernard A. Schriever retired from active duty in the last week in August 1966. Among minor events happening that week, Richard L. Dunn was commissioned a 2Lt. in the U.S. Air Force. 😉
After the Air Force – Active, ARPA, and Acquisition Reform. General Schriever’s retirement from Air Force service did not mark the end of his active working life. He established a Washington-based consultancy firm and advised the Department of Transportation on the regulation of civil air transport, served on Nixon’s Presidential Advisory Council on Management Improvement in the early 1970s, was involved in Ronald Reagan’s election campaign and then his transition to the presidency, and, under President Reagan, served on various advisory bodies relating to foreign intelligence and defense management as well as the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Here might be a place to recall an incident from General Schriever’s career that was controversial at the time. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s successful launch of Sputnik the United States sought a response. President Eisenhower proposed an Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) as America’s first space agency. General Schriever thought this unwise as unnecessary and likely to result duplication of effort and diversion of resources from key programs. General Schriever had access to the press and his views were widely publicized. One headline read “Revolt of the General.” ARPA operated as a space agency for most of 1958 until the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created and took over the national civil space program. Among key projects started under ARPA (which morphed into a diversified research and technology organization) was the Saturn launch vehicle which later became the key component in America’s moon landing. ARPA’s lean organization and management style were in some respects reminiscent of WDD. General Schriever’s opinion of ARPA (later DARPA) was to change, and he came to hold the agency in high regard.
In 1985 President Reagan commissioned the President’s Blue Ribbon Panel on Defense Management (Packard Commission). In early 1986 General Schriever sent Chairman David Packard a ¾-inch thick binder primarily addressing the lack of timely fielding of new capabilities. The first attachment referred to in the cover letter was a memorandum written by General Eisenhower in 1946 (Scientific and Technological Resources as Military Assets). His cover letter (“Dear Dave”) included the following comments.
His (Eisenhower’s) philosophy so ably expressed, called for the closest cooperation of the military with science and industry in time of peace as well as in war… However, during the last several decades we have lost the way. As a result, the timely fielding of qualitatively superior weapons is not being achieved.
General Schriever included several bullet points upon which he said there was general consensus. These included:
We have let the acquisition time from laboratory to initial operational capability (IOC) more than double and costs inflate enormously.
We are not moving rapidly enough in putting technologies into systems and are no longer taking the same prudent risks…as we did in the 50’s.
We have taken the management authority out of the hands of the Program Director in the wake of a maze of top-down micro-management. We often fail to keep the Program Director and his staff in place long enough for program stability.
We have more rules, requirements, documents, people, reviewers, and checkers than ever before involved non-productively in the decision-making process.
The final Packard Commission report (June 1986) chapter on defense acquisition reflected many of the same views General Schriever advocated. Unfortunately, in the next few years there was little evidence the “costs too much, takes too long” acquisition system was changing for the better.
General Schriever had a wide circle of friends. Among them were some that had the same concerns that he did. These included Paul Baran, inventor of packet-switching; Dr. Burton Edelson, former NASA Associate Administrator for Space, Science and Applications; V-Admiral William Howser, retired naval aviator and more recently an executive at COMSAT Corp. and others. In 1988 they jointly authored a letter to the Pentagon urging the revitalization of defense research and development and its approach to getting new technologies into systems. Apparently, the letter was sent to various Pentagon offices for staffing where no office admitted it was the correct one to draft a reply. Eventually their letter was sent to DARPA where it ended up on my desk. I replied that DARPA agreed with their concerns but to give full effect to their goals new legislation was needed. I agreed to meet with them and help in drafting such legislation.
After a few discussions, General Schriever and some members of his group met with Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and shared their ideas as well as reported DARPA was willing to support legislation. A week later the Director of DARPA met with Chairman Nunn who asked about the “grey beards” (Schriever group) he had met with. The Chairman was informed that the Director of DARPA was aware of the proposal, supported it and his General Counsel (me) knew the details. Senator Nunn said he would have his man (staffer) call DARPA’s man. Within months flexible R&D contracting authority (“Other Transactions”) was included in the National Defense Authorization Act and became law. General Schriever and members of his group were informed both of the passage of the legislation and a few months later that the first “Other Transaction” (OT) agreement had been signed. Since then, billions of dollars have been obligated using OT agreements and the Secretary of Defense recently directed that the Department adopt a “general preference” for using OTs for research and development of new defense capabilities.
Despite the groundbreaking legislation General Schriever helped to get enacted, defense acquisition still takes too long and costs too much. The contracting community is brought up in a bureaucracy of rules, paperwork and asking permission. The primary job of a contracting officer is compliance rather than accomplishing the mission of fielding new capabilities in a timely and affordable fashion. The program manager who should be the center of the acquisition team often must simply wait while the contracting office churns through its non-value added procedures. Thanks in part to Bennie Schriever the tools are available, if only leadership and the workforce knew their history and how to use them. General Schriever’s career and his cogent submission to the Packard Commission should be studied by everyone associated with defense acquisition as well those interested in the history of the Air Force and aero-space technology.
I am proud to have known Bennie Schriever, worked with him, interviewed him about his World War Two experiences, and considered him a friend. However, I could never bring myself to address him as Bennie. To me he was the epitome of a General.
written by Richard L. Dunn
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